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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH H. DIENES, and 
DIANNE D. McMAIN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a Washington 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11048 
Appellants will be referred to as plaintiffs and 
the Respondent will be referred to as the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover $10,000.00 under 
the double indemnity provisions of an accidental 
death and dismemberment clause of a life insurance 
policy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury, which returned 
a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiffs, "No Cause of Action". Judgment was 
entered on June 15, 1967 (R. 9 and R. 11). 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment 
entered on the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant issued an accidental death and 
dismemberment policy on the life of Lewis S. DiEnes 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. See the last page of the ex-
hibit for pertinent provisions). The plaintiff Judith 
H. DiEnes, surviving wife, was married to Mr. Di-
Enes in 1961, and plaintiff Dianne D. McMain, is 
a daughter by a former marriage ( R. 72). They 
claim that Lewis S. DiEnes died as the result of an 
accident under the provisions of the policy which 
state: 
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DIS-
MEMBERMENT BENEFITS. - Subject to 
the exclusion provision, if any employee, while 
insured by this policy and prior to retirement, 
sustains bodily injuries effected solely 
through e x t e r n a 1, violent and accidental 
means, and as a result thereof, suffers within 
90 days one of the following losses, Lifeco In-
surance Company of America will pay the ap-
picable amount specified in the Schedule of 
Insurance for Accidental Death and Dismem-
berment Insurance, or one-half such amount, 
as indicated: 
1. For loss of life, the full amount"; 
* * * 
"EXCLUSIONS - No Benefits under 
this Accidental Death and Dismemberment 
provision shall be paid for accidental death 
or dismemberment caused by: 
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1. Disease or bodily or mental infirmity 
or i:iedical or sur~ica.l trea~ment thereof, pto: 
n:ame or b~ctenal mf ect10n (except inf ec-
tions occurrmg through an accidental cut or 
wound); ... 
* * * 
Because of the extensive medical history of the 
insured, the defendant deems it necessary to set 
forth some of that background as established at the 
trial. 
The deceased, Lewis DiEnes, sustained minor 
injuries when he drove his automobile into the rear 
end of a parked taxicab on August 5, 1965 (R. 6). 
He suffered a 1.5 cm. laceration of the nose, abra-
sions to the face and knees, and was hit in the stom-
ach fairly hard (Ex. 3-D, & Record of Surgical Pro-
cedure 8-5-67). He was taken to the hospital and 
was given an examination by Dr. Donald E. Smith. 
An electrocardiogram was taken as well as a routine 
blood count, and he was otherwise prepared for a 
minor surgical procedure whereby his nose was su-
tured. He tolerated the procedure well (Ex. 3-D) 
and Mrs. DiEnes stated that his condition was good. 
He ate a good dinner and she left for her home about 
9 :30 p.m. Mr. DiEnes wanted to go with her (R. 
74), but the Doctor insisted that he stay at the hos-
pital (R. 72, 7 4, 84). 
Dr. Smith first treated Mr. DiEnes February 
4, 1964, at which time he gave him a thorough phys-
ical examination (R. 76). He noted a past history of 
heart disease. Mr. DiEnes suffered a myocardial in-
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fraction in March 1962 ( R. 7 4) . He was suffering 
from angina pectoris and was under medication for 
this disease (R. 77). The resulting pain is from an 
insufficient supply of blood and oxygen to the heart 
muscles (R. 77). He also had hypertension or high 
blood pressure, arteriosclerotic heart disease and a 
past history of kidney stones ( R. 77). Dr. Smith 
also saw him in September 1964 for what he then 
considered was a "disturbing new development"; a 
severe attack of bronchial asthma (R. 78). At the 
time he didn't think the asthma was related to the 
heart problem. Esterliazine, a relaxant to control in-
somnia resulting from apprehension was prescribed 
(R. 78). The doctor continued to see Mr. DiEnes at 
two week intervals. The next significant change oc-
curred January 29, 1965, when Mr. DiEnes started 
showing early signs of "congestive heart failure" 
( R. 79). The Doctor explained that this disease de-
velops when the heart cannot keep up the pumping 
load required and as a result becomes enlarged and 
congestion begins to develop in other tissues of the 
body and into the lungs. He then determined that 
the breathing problem was a secondary symptom of 
the congestive heart failure ( R. 80). Mr. DiEnes 
began to show signs of puffiness of the ankles, mark-
ed shortness of breath and x-ray studies showed an 
enlarged ·heart, which condition is tied to congestive 
heart failure disease (R. 80, 92). Mr. DiEnes was 
given digitalis for treatment of early congestive 
heart failure ( R. 80). At about this time Mr. Di-
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Enes experienced a "distressing circumstance" when 
it became necessary for him to go to Chicago to ar-
range for the funeral of his sister. The doctor indi-
cated that he was "very definitely worse following 
that episode ... " (R. 81). 
Mr. DiEnes was on medication for high blood 
pressure, hyperdill to improve his circulation, digi-
talis to strengthen and improve the heart's efficien-
cy when in a state of failure, diuretics to assist the 
kidneys to eliminate excess fluid and relieve con-
gestion of tissues, all of which problems were sec-
ondary to the congestive heart failure (R. 82). Mr. 
DiEnnes was a very tense person and was never 
calm (R. 83, 93). 
Dr. Smith saw Mr. DiEnes between 6:00 and 
8:00 o'clock in the evening of the day of the accident 
and although he wanted to go home the Doctor in-
sisted that he stay at the hospital (R. 84). Two 
months prior to the date of the accident Mr. DiEnes 
had a myocardial infraction, a physical malfunction 
in which a clot blocks a vein that supplies the heart 
and the heart muscle dies. Dr. Smith had then con-
templated surgical intervention (R. 85, 91). On 
cross-examination Dr. Smith testified that it was 
unlikely that the injuries resulting from the minor 
automobile accident would have caused death, inde-
pendent of the previous heart con di ti on ( R. 88). 
The accident did not cause any change in the electro-
cardiogram from the one taken two months earlier 
( R. 82) . At 1 : 00 A. M. on the morning following the 
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accident, Mr. DiEnes was awakened at the hospital 
by a nurse for the purpose of taking his temperatme, 
respiration and pulse, which was done and all were 
found to be normal. Ten minutes later he was found 
dead (R. 91). Dr. Smith prepared the death certif. 
icate, which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 
2-P. The Doctor stated that it was his belief that the 
"automobile accident was a direct, contributing fac-
tor to his final heart attack ( R. 86). 
Dr. Smith admitted that Mr. DiEnes' medical 
history was one of continual worsening condition 
( R. 93) . He also agreed with Dr. Carlquist' s diag-
nosis following the autopsy, which states in part as 
follows: 
"MAJOR DIAGNOSIS: 
Marked coronary sclerosis with moder· 
ately recent thrombosis; myocardial ne· 
crosis, old and recent, with mural throm· 
bus formation at left apex; congestion of 
viscera; renal calculi, left, laceration of 
nose and abrasion of face and knees. 
"COMMENT: 
This man showed an extreme degree of 
coronary sclerosis with tremendous nar-
rowing of the lumen of the vessels due to 
both sclerosis and thrombosis. As a re· 
sult, there was marked destruction of the 
myocardium in all blocks studied. The 
more acute necrosis was at the apex of 
the left ventricle and a mural thrombus 
had formed in this area. He had been in 
some degree of congestive failure as 
shown by the sections of the lung, liver 
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and spleen. He also showed the effects of 
his recent accident with laceration of the 
nose and abrasions of face and knees." 
(Ex. 3-D p. 25). 
The "moderately recent thrombosis", referred 
to probably resulted from the heart attack in June 
of 1965 (R. 95). The "congestion of viscera", re-
fers to congestion of the intestines, which is a result 
of "ensuing congestive heart failure" ( R. 95) . The 
notation that "He had been in some degree of con-
gestive failure, as shown by sections of lung, liver 
and spleen", indicated he had been in this degree of 
congestive failure prior to the accident (R. 96). The 
doctor admitted that Mr. DiEnes' condition had 
worsened to a point where "any episode of serious 
anxiety could have caused him to expire," and that 
he experienced periods of anxiety at night because 
he couldn't sleep and had difficulty in breathing 
(R. 97, 98). 
Dr. Carlquist, a pathologist and director of la-
boratories at L.D.S. Hospital, testified that he had 
performed an autopsy on Lewis DiEnes, August 6, 
1965 (R. 102). As noted above, the major findings 
were those related to the heart (R. 104). His autop-
sy report is contained as a part of the hospital re-
cords, Exhibit D-3, beginning at page 25 (R. 105). 
His findings revealed an occlusion of both coronary 
arteries, which supply blood to the heart muscles 
(R. 105). The lumen, or the openings in the blood 
vessels, were almost completely closed by the sclero-
sis process and only a "tiny opening that would rep-
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resent approximately 5% of the former total open. 
ing" was available for passage of blood. In addition, 
portions of the lumen were filled with degenerating 
blood, representing the thrombus of some of the ves-
sels ( R. 105). The doctor then drew a diagram in 
connection with Exhibit 4-D, in which he graphical-
ly portrayed the available opening in the blood ves-
sels in relation to the normal opening ( R. 106-107). 
He found old clotting in some areas so that there 
was no passage possible through parts of these ves-
sels. This condition usually develops over a period of 
years ( R. 107. He also found a "sclerotic con di ti on 
in the right coronary arteries" although not as in-
volved as the left ( R. 107). There was also damage 
to the heart muscle (R. 107-108). The left ventricle 
wall of the heart had also thinned from a normal 
thickness of about 1.6 centimeters to 1.2 centimeters 
in thickness; "a rather thin wall" (R. 108). The 
degeneration process of the deceased heart had pro· 
gressed to a point that on the left ventricle wall of 
the heart blood clots or "thrombii" had formed and 
were adhered to the wall ( R. 108, 109) . These clots 
had formed prior to death and the kidneys also show-
ed a condition of nephroscelrotic secondary to heart 
disease ( R. 109). The liver showed evidence of 
chronic passive congestion secondary to heart failure 
( R. 110). The spleen and lungs also revealed that 
Mr. DiEnes was suffering from congestive heart 
failure (R. 109). 
In the opinion of the pathologist, DiEnes died 
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"as a result of severe cardiac damage; his severe 
heart disease," which condition predated the acci-
dent (R. 110, 115). He didn't attempt to assess the 
relationship between the accident and the heart con-
dition (R. 115). 
Dr. George Curtis, a specialist in internal med-
icine and cardiology also testified. No reference at 
all is contained in Plaintiff's Brief under statement 
of "MATERIAL FACTS", to his testimony. He ex-
plained that the heart attack Mr. DiEnes suffered 
in 1965 involved a different artery of the heart than 
the first one in 1962 ( R. 20). This can be clinically 
determined because when a heart muscle dies it re-
leases an enzyeme into the blood which can be meas-
ured. He confirmed the finding of Dr. Smith that 
the electrocardiogram which was taken on the day 
of the accident, August 4, 1965, showed no change 
from the one which was taken in June of the same 
year, although it did show changes as a result of the 
1962 and 1965 heart attacks (R. 121). The results 
of the electrocardiogram did not have any signifi-
cance insofar as injuries sustained in the accident 
were concerned ( R. 122). He expressed his opinion 
that the accident had no connection with the death 
of Mr. DiEnes (R. 123). 
The autopsy report in Dr. Curtis' opinion, show-
ed the following essential findings= 
"One, a markedly enlarged heart that 
was really twice as large as normal. 
"Second, it showed sever~ arterioscler-
osis, with a complete obstruction of the ar-
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teries in two of the main arteries and inter. 
mittent obstruction. 
"The third, artery there, it showed evi-
dence of old heart attacks, with marked des-
truction of the muscle and a destruction of 
the septum between the two sides of the heart 
and it showed recent thrombus clots in othe{ 
part~ of the a~·teries o~ his heart, showing ex-
tensive arter10sclerotic heart disease with 
very little blood getting through any of these 
major arteries." ( R. 124). 
On cross-examination, he testified that anxiety 
can be a precipitating cause of a further heart prob-
lem, but he didn't believe that the anxiety factor was 
a contributing factor to the death of Mr. DiEnes (R. 
125). In his opinion, Mr. DiEnes had already lived 
longer than one would expect ( R. 125). 
Following presentation of the plaintiffs' case, 
the defendant made a Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint, upon the grounds that the evidence, as a 
matter of law, showed that the claim for the addi-
tional accidental death benefit was not due under 
the policy, because the prior heart disease was a 
contributing factor to Mr. DiEnes' death (R. 98). 
The defendant's Motion was based upon a reading 
of the "Accidental Death and Dismemberment Ben-
efits" provision to the effect that before the benefits 
would become due, death had to result ''from bodily 
injuries effected solely through external, violent and 
accidental means ... " The Court then indicated that 
he was inclined to reject this argument, which he 
later did, and stated: 
10 
"THE COURT: 
. "My pres~nt feeling is that I would have 
to mstruct - if I permitted that to go to the 
jury -. in this fashion: 'In order to prove the 
essential elements, plaintiffs claim the bur-
den is on them to establish by a preponder-
ance o~ ~he evidence in the case the following 
propos1t10n: That the death of Lewis DiEnes 
resulted from bodily injuries effected solely 




1'If your Honor gives that instruction, I 
don't think I would take an exception, if you 
gave it in that precise form you just gave it." 
(R. 100). 
Further colloquy and argument occurred be-
tween the Court and counsel, but in essence the 
Court denied the defendant's Motion when it was 
renewed following the close of the evidence ( R. 
126). Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the heart di-
sease was at least "a contributing factor" in DiEnes' 
death ( R. 127). The court properly analyzed the 
situation by stating that if he ruled in favor of the 
defendant's contention, he would direct the jury to 
return a verdict in favor of the defendant. However, 
he denied the defendant's Motion and ruled that it 
was a matter for the jury to determine by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, whether the death came 
within the provisions of the policy and hence sub-





THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER 
IN WHICH IT SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
THE ISSUE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE IN-
SURANCE POLICY, AND THERE WAS SUF-
FICIENT E V I D E N C E TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S FINDING THAT DECEDENT'S 
D E AT H RESULTED FROM NA TUR AL 
CAUSES UNRELATED TO INJURIES SUS-
TAINED IN THE ACCIDENT. 
The plaintiffs contend that the language of the 
policy does not require them to prove that his death 
resulted solely from the injuries incurred by ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means (Plaintiffs' 
Brief p. 12). As noted, the defendant's counsel 
made a motion at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' 
case for an involuntary nonsuit on the grounds that 
as a matter of law there was no coverage because 
the testimony conclusively showed that the prior 
heart disease was a contributing cause of the death, 
and therefore, the death did not result solely from 
the automobile injuries ( R. 98, 99, 127). Mr. Man-
gum agreed with this interpretation of the evidence 
(R. 127). The trial court rejected the defendant's 
contention and denied the Motion for Nonsuit. The 
Court aptly summed up the two positions of the 
parties in this language : 
"THE COURT: 
"Plaintiff, in effect, contends that the 
contract means that, if death resulted because 
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of accident and illness, plaintiff is entitled to 
recover." 
* * * 
"Defendant contends, in essence, that if 
death resulted because of a combination of 
accident and illness, plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover." ( R. 134, 135). 
The Court in further considerating the motion 
stated: 
"THE COURT: 
"If I rule on the interpretation of the 
policy in favor of Mr. Hanson's (defendant's) 
contention then, I will direct the jury. 
"MR. MANGUM: 
"I realize that; I hope you don't, but I 
realize that is the provision." 
"THE COURT: 
''If I rule on your contention as to the 
interpretation of the policy, it seems to me 
that I must submit the matter to the jury, 
then, to determine the preponderance of the 
evidence." 
"MR. MANGUM: 
"I agree with that." (R. 128). 
Thereafter the court submitted the matter to 
the jury and therefore accepted the plaintiffs' theory 
that it was a jury question as to whether or not 
death resulted within the coverage of the policy. 
The Court submitted this question to the jury 
in the language of the policy, in its Instruction No. 
15, which is as follows: 
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"INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
"In order to prove the essential elements 
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
in the case the following proposition: That 
the death of Lewis DiEnes was a result of 
bodily injuries effected solely through exter-
nal, violent and accidental means." 
Plaintiffs' counsel had previously impliedly in-
dicated to the Court that this instruction, if given in 
the form indicated, would be acceptable (R. 100). 
Although the defendant does not agree that the trial 
court was correct in denying its Motion for an In-
voluntary Nonsuit and for a Directed Verdict at the 
conclusion of the evidence, doubt was resolved in 
favor of the plaintiff on the question of cause of 
death by submitting the matter to the jury. 
A considerable portion of the plaintiffs' Brief 
contains a discussion of cases dealing with the legal 
effect of language in certain insurance policies con-
sidered by this and other courts. The major thrust 
is to the effect that the present policy as written, 
would permit a finding that the plaintiffs could 
recover if Mr. DiEnes' death occurred as a result 
of injuries effected ·" ... solely through external, 
violent and accidental means ... " It is conceded 
that the evidence "conclusively shows that the di-
seased heart of Mr. DiEnes was a concurring cause 
of his death", but they "deny the obligation to prove 
that his death was the 'sole result' " of the injuries 
received in the minor automobile accident. They ac-
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knowledge that if this contention is wrong the ap-
peal should be dismissed. The plaintiffs were not 
given the burden of proving that the accident was 
the "sole cause". The trial court submitted this ques-
tion to the jury in the precise language of the policy. 
In so doing, the court, in effect, accepted plaintiffs' 
argument concerning the interpretation of the pol-
icy. 
The plaintiff cites the case of Standard Life 
ln.'3. Co. vs. Foster, 210 Miss. 242, 49 S.2d 391 
(1950), as authority for the proposition that it is 
a jury question as to whether or not death of the in-
sured was the "proximate result of bodily injuries 
which were effected solely by external, violent and 
accidental means". In that case the court held there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain a judgment on a 
verdict for the plaintiff on conflicting evidence. We 
submit that this issue was in fact submitted to the 
jury in this case, and a determination adverse to the 
plaintiffs was made. 
The evidence in the case was sufficient to have 
justified the court in granting defendant's Motion 
for Involuntary Nonsuit following presentation of 
plaintiffs' case, or a Directed Verdict in its favor 
following the close of evidence. Browning vs. Equi-
table Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 
1060, 1073-74 (1937), was an action on a policy in-
suring against loss resulting "directly and indepen-
dently of all other causes from bodily injuries effect-
ed solely through external, violent and accidental 
means." The court affirmed the decision in favor of 
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the plaintiff, holding that there was no evidenc that 
there was an existing disease within the meaning of 
the law at the time of the accident which produced 
the plaintiff's disability and that the toxemia which 
probably existed in the insured's system at the time 
of the accident, later causing arthritis in the injured 
finger, was a mere condition and not a moving cause 
of the injury. The Court in its opinion analyzes the 
decisions construing similar policy provisions as 
follows: 
"An injury effected through violent, ex-
ternal, and accidental means, entirely inde-
pendent of all other causes, have made three 
distinctions or classes of cases: ( 1) When an 
accident causes a diseased condition which, 
together with the accident, results in the in-
jury or death complained of, the accident 
alone is to be considered as the cause of the 
injury or death. French vs. Fidelity & Cas-
ualty Co., 135 Wis. 259, 115 N.W. 869, 17 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1011, Cary vs. Preferred Acc. 
Ins. Co. of New York, 127 Wis. 67, 106 N.W. 
1055, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 926, 115 Am. St. Rep. 
997, 7 Ann. Cas. 484. (2) When, at the time 
of the accident, the insured was suffering 
from some disease, but the disease had no 
causal connection with the injury or death re-
sulting from the accident, the accident is to 
be considered the sole cause. Bohdker vs. 
Travelers' Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 32, 102 N.E. 
342, 344, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 543. (3) W~en. at 
the time of the accident there was an existing 
disease which, cooperating with the acci~ent, 
resulted in the injury or death, the accident 
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or as 
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the. cause independent of all other causes. 
Smith vs. Federal Life Ins. Co., (D.C.) 6 F.2d 
283; Cretney vs. Wodmen Acc. Co., 196 Wis. 
29, 219 N.W. 448, 62 A.L.R. 675; Leland vs. 
Order of United Commercial Travelers of 
America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N.E. 517, 520." 
The trial court held that the plaintiff's claim 
fell within the first class which was affirmed by 
the majority of the Court. If the claim had fallen 
within the third class, there would have been no 
coverage. The additional excerpt from the opinion is 
pertinent: 
"On such a record, can the case fall with-
in class ( 3) so as to bar a recovery? This class 
requires that there be an existing disease, one 
existing at the time of the accident, which co-
operates with the accident to produce the dis-
ability. Cretney vs. Woodmen Acc. Co. 196 
Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448, 62 A.L.R. 675. We 
have searched the record in vain for any evi-
dence that there was an existing disease with-
in the meaning of the law, at the time of the 
accident, which produced the disability. Two 
propositions of law are thus presented which 
we shall discuss from the authorities. First, 
that an existing disease, to take a case out of 
the insured provisions of the policy, does not 
mean a temporary disorder or derangement 
of the bodily organs, system, or functions, 
nor does it mean a tendency or susceptibility 
to a disease, but means a chronic or d~finite 
affliction such as would be embraced m the 
common understanding and meaning of the 
term 'diseased' or 'sick'; and second, that the 
term 'independently of all other causes' does 
not mean uninfluenced or unaffected by any 
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other cause, but i;ieans uncontrolled by any 
other cause, that is, that there was no inde-
pendent intervening cause unproduced or un-
mfluenced by the injury, which, acting of it-
self and without stimulation by the injury, 
tends to produce the result." 
It seems clear that the present facts fall within 
class (3) enumerated by the court; that is that there 
was an existing disease which was the concurring 
sole cause of the death, and there is no coverage. See 
also annotation, Pre-existing physical condition as 
affecting liability under accident policy or accident 
f ea tu re of Zif e policy, 84 A.L.R. 2d 176. 
Were the Court to go further than it did in 
instructing the jury, it would have in fact been pre-
senting the arguments of counsel under guise of the 
court's Instructions. This, of course, would have re-
sulted in prejudicial error. The plaintiffs' cause is 
not aided by citing to the court the law that insur-
ance policies must be construed in favor of the in-
sured, as stated in Browning vs. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc., Supra, because the court in construing 
the language of the present policy did resolve doubt 
in favor of coverage and submitted the question of 
cause of death to the jury. However, it would have 
been error for the court to submit the matter to the 
jury on the plaintiffs' theory, as was done, and then 
in effect, further advise the jury that they were in-
structed to resolve doubts in favor of the plaintiffs 
by presenting plaintiffs' argument under the sancti-
ty of a court's "instruction". 
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Plaintiffs in their statement of ~'MATERIAL 
FACTS" avoid any reference to the testimony of 
Dr. George Curtis, which was favorable to defen-
dant, even though the plaintiffs, as appellants were 
under the responsibility of reciting the facts in "the 
light most favorable to the party who prevailed be-
low." Ortega vs. Thomas, 14 U.2d 296, 297, 383 
P.2d 406 (1963). 
Dr. Smith testified that the minor accident in 
which DiEnes was involved was a contributing fac-
tor in bringing about his death. Dr. Carlquist did 
not attempt to assess the relationship of the accident 
to the cause of death. Dr. Curtis testified that the 
accident was in no way responsible for his death, 
and that he had such advanced heart disease that 
he had already lived beyond what one would normal-
ly expect a person with his symptoms to live. 
The evidence was undisputed that Dr. Smith, 
decedent's private physician, gave Mr. DiEnes a 
thorough examination, including an electrocardio-
gram and assured himself that Mr. DiEnes could 
undergo minor surgery without ill effects for the 
purpose of suturing his nose laceration. The electro-
cardiogram, taken upon admission to the hospital, 
showed no change as a result of the accident. He 
tolerated the surgery well, ate his evening meal at 
the hospital, was found in good condition by his 
physician when visited between 6:00 and 8:00 o'-
clock p.m. and also by his wife, who visited him 
until 9 :30 p.m. He was sleeping soundly at 1 :00 
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a.m. when he was awakened by the nurse for the 
purpose of checking his pulse, temperature and res-
piration, all of which were normal. Mr. DiEnes died 
ten minutes later. These facts, together with the 
opinions of the medical experts which were in con-
flict as to the cause of death, were in sharp focus. 
There was then properly before the jury the very 
question which the plaintiff contends was not pre-
sented to them for consideration, i.e., whether or not 
Mr. DiEnes' death resulted from " ... bodily in-
juries effected soley through external, violent and 
accidental means ... " The jury determined that 
the death did not so result and there is ample evi-
dence in the record to support that finding. This 
court in Hales vs. Peterson, 11 U.2d 411, 360 P.2d 
822, 824 ( 1961) stated: 
"We have heretofore recognized the im-
portance of safeguarding the right of trial by 
jury. A necessary corollary to it is that there 
must be some solidarity in the result so that 
it can be relied upon. To the extent the verdict 
can easily be set aside by the court, the ri~lit 
to trial by jury is weakened. In order to give 
substance to the right, once the trial has been 
had and a verdict rendered it should not be 
regarded lightly, nor overturned because of 
errors or irregularities unless they are of suf-
ficient consequence to have affected the result. 
1"Anyone acquainted with the practical 
operation of a trial by jury and the human 
factors that must play a part therein is aware 
that it would be almost impossible to complete 
a trial of any length without some things oc-
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curring with which counsel, after the case is 
lost, can find fault and, in zeal for his cause 
all quite in good faith, magnify into erro; 
which to him and the losing parties seems 
blamable for their failure to prevail. However, 
from th~ st.andpoint of administering even-
handed Justice the court must dispassionately 
survey such claims against the overall picture 
of the trial, and if the parties have been af-
forded an opportunity to fully and fairly pre-
sent their evidence and arguments upon the 
issues, and the jury has made its determina-
tion thereon, the objective of the proceeding 
has been accomplished. And the judgment 
should not be disturbed unless it is shown that 
there is error which is substantial and preju-
dicial in the sense that it appears that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been different in the absence of 
h " sue error, ... 
The verdict and judgment of the trial court is 
entitled to a presumption of validity and should not 
be overturned except for the reasons indicated. Bre-
reton vs. Dixon, 20 U.2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967). 
It is submitted that the plaintiffs were given 
a full opportunity to try their case and present that 
evidence which they believed would sustain their 
claims. The plaintiffs' theory of recovery was sub-
mitted to the jury in the language of the policy with-
out embellishment or unnecessary comment. The 
language of the policy was not ambiguous. The 
terms used in the insuring statement were simple 
and subject to common understanding. The jury de-
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termined by a preponderance of the evidence that 
death resulted from heart disease of a serious and 
long standing nature and not as the result of the 
"injuries effected solely through external, violent 
and accidental means, ... " Since there is ample 
credibile testimony in the record upon which they 
could make that finding, the judgment entered on 
their verdict should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 16, 17, 18 AND 
19. 
The plaintiffs claim that their theory of the 
case, as set forth in Instruction Numbers 16, 17, 18 
and 19, was not presented to the jury. 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 16: 
"You are instructed that from the undis-
puted testimony in this case Mr. DiEnes did 
in fact suffer an acute coronary insufficiency 
on August 5, 1965, which was the immediate 
cause of his death. You must determine by a 
preponderance of the evidence whether the 
acute coronary insufficiency was set in mo-
tion by accidental injuries sustained by Mr. 
DiEnes, or whether the acute coronary insuf-
ficiency was controlled, directed or influenced 
·in its action or behavior by accidental injur-
ies sustained by Mr. DiEnes. If you find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the acute 
coronary insufficiency was set in motion, con-
trolled directed or influenced by accidental injuri~s to Mr. DiEnes, then you may find 
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that the coronary insufficiency and death 
were a result of the accident, and not the in-
dependent cause of the death of Mr. DiEnes." 
By the instruction, the jury is first advised that 
the immediate cause of death was "an acute coron-
ary insufficiency." The second sentence of the in-
struction advises the jury that their responsibility 
is to determine between two alternatives: ( 1) Whe-
ther the coronary insufficiency was set in motion by 
the accidental injuries sustained by DiEnes, or (2) 
whether the coronary insufficiency was "controlled, 
directed or influenced in its action or behavior by 
accidental injuries sustained by DiEnes." A choice 
between these two alternatives is the equivalent of 
a directed verdict. The second alternative is but a 
restatement of the first and is argumentative. More 
obvious, however, is the omission from the requested 
instruction of the primary question of whether the 
'''acute coronary insufficiency" was the result of the 
prior heart disease experienced by DiEnes over a 
number of years. The whole instruction is in an 
argumentative form emphasizing the plaintiffs' 
view of the evidence. 
The substance of this requested instruction was 
properly given in Instruction No. 15, which accur-
ately sets forth the insuring provisions of the policy 
without unnecessary comment. 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 17, is as 
follows: 
"Starting with a bo.dily inj.ury, all ~or­
bid changes in the exercise of vital funct10ns 
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which result from or are induced by such in-
jury should be regarded as the effect thereof 
and not as independent causes. When death 
results from any such morbid change so re-
~ulting from or induced.by such injury, the in-
~ur:y and not the morbid change induced by 
it, is the cause of death. Beginning with a 
primary cause, conditions induced by such 
cause and effects thereof, and every condition 
so induced must be considered in relation 
thereto as an effect and not as a cause." 
This instruction is a more obvious comment on 
the evidence than No. 16. It is a direct attempt to 
slant the testimony in favor of a plaintiffs' verdict. 
The question for jury consideration was not whether 
there had been a "morbid change, so resulting from 
or induced by such injury", but whether or not Di-
Enes' death resulted from " ... bodily injuries ef-
fected solely through external, violent and accidental 
means ... ", and this question was presented to the 
jury. 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 18, reads 
as follows: 
'''You are instructed that when an insur-
ance company insures the life of an individual 
with an accidental double indemnity policy, 
that the insurance company takes that i~di­
vidual 'as he is.' If an accident by operatmg 
on that particular insured individual actually 
set in motion causes which would not have 
been set in motion in a normal person but 
which, nevertheless, resulted in the de:~,th of 
the insured, it is a reasonable construct10n ~f 
the policy to hold that the death was the di-








Again, this requested Instruction is not only 
an unfair comment upon the evidence of the case, 
it is an attempt to have the Court argue the plain-
tiffs' theory of the case under the quise of an in-
struction. His also duplicitous. 
The folly of attempting to argue one's case in 
the instructions rather than to confine them to a 
statement of the issues of law, has been previously 
condemned by this Court. Cornwell vs. Barton, 18 
U.2d 325, 422 P.2d 663 (1967). 
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 19, reads 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that under the terms 
of the policy involved in this case, the deceas-
ed, Mr. DiEnes, must have: 
"l. Sustained bodily injuries effected 
solely through external, violent and accidental 
means in order to recover, and 
"2. As a result of such injuries, his 
death must have occurred within ninety days. 
"The death need not have resulted solely 
from the injuries incurred by external, violent 
and accidental means, but must have occurred 
as a result of these injuries in order for plain-
tiffs to recover." 
Here again, the plaintiffs have attempted to 
rewrite the insuring language in terms favorable 
to themselves. The substance of this instruction was 
given in Instruction No. 15, as follows: 
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"INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
~'In order to prove the essential elements 
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them 
to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in the case the following proposition: 
That the death of Louis DiEnes was a result 
of bodily injuries effected solely through ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means." 
As previously noted, the plaintiffs implied to 
the court that if the jury were instructed in the 
language of Instruction No. 15, that such would be 
acceptable ( R. 100) . 
It is submitted that each of the requested in-
structions were properly denied by the court. None, 
nor all of them, were proper substitutes, for the plain 
and simple language contained in the policy. Had 
the requested instructions been given, they would 
have overshadowed the real issue of the case, i.e., 
did the plaintiffs' decedent sustain " ... bodily in-
juries effected solely through external, violent and 
accidental means, ... " from which he died. That 
precise question was presented to the jury for de-
termination in the court's Instruction No. 15. 
The plaintiffs contend that defendant's counsel 
committed error in his summation to the jury by 
reading the court's instruction No. 15 and stating 
that the plaintiffs could not recover unless they 
proved that the death of DiEnes resulted solely from 
injuries effected through external, violent and acci-
dental means. This was substantially the language 
of the instruction, and it is difficult to see how such 
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a statement could result in prejudice. Defendant's 
counsel merely argued his view of the facts to which 
the instruction was applicable. Plaintiffs' counsel 
had the same privilege. In any event, this court has 
stated that: 
"If something occurs which the party 
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that 
he thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must 
make his objection promptly and seek redress 
by moving for a mistrial, or by having cau-
tionary instructions given, if that be deemed 
adequate, or be held to waive whatever rights 
may have existed to do so." Hill vs. Cloward, 
14 U.2d 55, 58, 377 P.2d 186 (1962). 
Plaintiffs' counsel made no such request of the 
Court (R. 140). 
Further, the jury was admonished in Instruc-
tion No. 9 not to consider or be influenced by any 
statement of counsel as to what the evidence is, un-
less stated correctly, or in any statement of counsel 
of facts not shown in the evidence. 
The plaintiff further argues that: 
"There can be no dispute that Mr. Di-
Enes sustained 'bodily injuries effected solely 
through external, violent and a c c i d e n t a 1 
means'." (Plaintiffs' Brief p.26). 
They allege prejudicial error because the court re-
fused to so instruct the jury. If there was no ques-
tion about those matters being factual, it would seem 
to be as obvious to the jury as to the court, and no 
prejudicial error could result from failing to em-
phasize that fact with the jury. 
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The court denied defendant's Motion for a non-
suit and permitted the jury to consider the central 
question of whether or not DiEnes' death resulted 
from '''. . . bodily injuries effected solely through 
external, violent and accidental means ... ", the 
very language of the policy. The jury unanimously 
rejected plaintiffs' claim and found that the plain-
tiff died from conditions related solely to his pre-
vious heart condition. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's theory of the case was properly 
considered by the court and submitted to the jury, 
not in the repetitious and argumentative form of 
plaintiffs' requested instructions, but in the plain, 
concise and simple language of the insuring provi-
sions of the policy. Plaintiffs impliedly consented to 
the form of Instruction No. 15, which presented the 
heart of the case to the jury. The other requested 
instructions were but comments to plaintiffs' view 
of the evidence, and it would have constituted pre-
judicial error had they seen given. There is ample 
evidence to sustain the jury's finding. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that defendant's counsel 
engaged in improper argument in his summation to 
the jury ·is without merit, and even if such an error 
were committed, plaintiffs' counsel did not preserve 
his right to assert it in this court. Additionally, it 
was not an irregularity of sufficient consequence 
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to have affected the result". Hale vs. Peterson, 11 
U. 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822-824 (1961). 
The judgment entered on the jury verdict 
should be affirmed. 
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